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et the child be excused by his age, the woman by her sex,’ says Seneca
in the treatise in which he vents his anger upon anger.” So wrote
Hugo Grotius in his 1625 masterwork titled The Law of War and
Peace. With that quotation, Grotius traced to the writings of an ancient
Roman philosopher the injunction against harming women and children
in time of war.
Grotius’ reiteration of Seneca’s words tacitly admitted that as late as
1625, armies still were violating the injunction. Sadly, the same is true 390
years later. Today, neither women nor children are excused from wartime
assaults, violence and upheaval.
In Syria alone, four years of conﬂict have left well over 220,000 persons
dead, and many more in dire need. Women and children are included
in those statistics; indeed, of the 12.5 million Syrians now requiring
humanitarian assistance, 5.6 million are children.
Conﬂicts elsewhere generate similarly grim numbers.

Author’s Note: This essay is based on the text of the talk I gave as the Distinguished Discussant for the
16th Annual Grotius Lecture delivered on April 9, 2014, in Washington, D.C., at the joint meeting of the
American Society of International Law and the International Law Association. Delivering the principal
lecture was Radhika Coomaraswamy, then a Global Professor of Law at the New York University School
of Law and formerly the special representative of the U.N. secretary-general on children & armed conﬂict
and the U.N. special rapporteur on violence against women. Her lecture and my response are reprinted
in volume 30 of the American University International Law Review (2015), pp. 1–52, and also will
appear in a forthcoming volume of ASIL Proceedings.

www.law.uga.edu

Advocate 2015

7

Legal discussions of such crises frequently turn on the
Such interrelations of subjugation and independence, of
discourse of human rights, according to which every person
isolation and cooperation, of the internal and the international,
enjoys upon birth certain fundamental rights, and the violation
pervade our world. Relationships of this sort may be found
of those rights demands a remedy. The discourse is deservedly a
to some degree in and among all member states of the United
cornerstone of post-World War II legal thinking.
Nations. They pertain as well to nonmember entities, such as
But the current human rights regime incurs criticism, as
Taiwan, Kosovo and Palestine.
Radhika Coomaraswamy pointed out in the talk that gave rise
It is in our efforts to restitch the remnants of colonization –
to this essay. I will examine some reasons for that criticism
and maybe, in places like Crimea, to confront a new colonial
with the aim of imagining a possible future – that of the postpatchwork – that we, the members of the global community,
postcolonial child.
are revealed as postcolonials.
Coomaraswamy, a Sri Lankan lawyer who has served as a
This is especially the case with regard to international law.
U.N. under-secretary-general, referred in particular to certain
International law is said to have forefathers: a few Spanish
postcolonial scholars from the global south. These scholars,
priests and the luminary quoted at the outset of this essay,
she said, “reject the human rights framework as part of the
Grotius. The periods of colonization in which these men lived
‘liberal’ ‘imperialist’ project especially when it comes to
shaped their writings; in turn, their writings shaped, even
cultural practices,” and they further “reject the dominance of
justiﬁed, the colonial project.
the European Enlightenment and the sacredness of the power
Grotius was, among many other things, a lawyer for the
of reason.”
Dutch East India Company. His position in the colonial era is
My own response to such rejections might raise hackles
evident in his espousal of jus praedae, the law of prize. It also
among some of those scholars, for it begins with
surfaces in his acceptance of slavery as a fact of the
this claim: We are all postcolonials now.
law of nations – albeit a fact “contrary to nature,” a
Legal discussions
By way of example, both of my own countries
practice that better nations would do well to avoid.
... frequently turn
of citizenship are postcolonial states.
Our own international legal system operates in
on the discourse of reaction to that colonial era. In the last half-century the
One is Ireland. This is the eighth decade
since the adoption of the Irish Constitution,
norm of sovereign equality empowered new states as
human rights ...
a postcolonial charter from which India later
they emerged out of eroded empires. This dispersion of
borrowed. Yet as demonstrated by the ﬁrst-ever
authority is apparent in one member-one vote bodies
visit to England by an Irish President – in 2014 – remnants of
like the U.N. General Assembly.
eight centuries of colonization still litter both islands.
Yet signiﬁcant power still resides exclusively in certain states;
My other country is, of course, the United States. Here,
most notably, the U.N. Security Council’s ﬁve permanent
the structure of government rests upon the postcolonial
members. Each of those so-called P-5 members has, at various
intuitions of the men who wrote its Constitution. Having
times, shown an imperialist streak. Vestiges of colonialism
won a revolution, these framers professed to borrow the best
remain hallmarks of our postcolonial epoch.
and to reject the worst from their colonial past. The choices
We are thus in need of post-postcolonialism. To paraphrase
they made two hundred years ago – admirable choices like the
Can the Subaltern Speak?, an oft-quoted 1988 writing by
checking of power and shameful ones like slavery – inﬂuence
Columbia Literature Professor Gayatri Spivak: Not only must
U.S. policy to this day.
the subaltern be permitted to speak, but when she does, others
To this day, moreover, Americans see themselves as having
must listen, must admit her as an equal to their ongoing
repulsed foreign tyranny and invented a superior form of
conversation, and must, eventually, adjust their behavior to
sovereignty. The American identity thus remains postcolonial
accommodate her place in their world.
– also, perhaps, preimperial. This self-perception contributes
Tulane Law Professor Adeno Addis aptly has labeled this
to seemingly contradictory impulses that have coexisted for
process “dialogic pluralism.”1
much of American history; to be speciﬁc, the U.S. afﬁnity for
intervention overseas and the U.S. aversion to scrutiny from
abroad.
1 Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic
Minorities, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 615 (1992).
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“Menwomenandchildren” is not a single word; discrete attention must
be paid to the many different hues of human experience. Victimization
may be an aspect of that experience, but it is not the only one.

Efforts toward this end may be found in the 1989
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 1979
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women. Each of these treaties enjoys wide membership
among the countries of the world (the United States, however,
belongs to neither). Each includes provisions aimed at
increasing participation by, and breaking down stereotypes
about, women or children.
Nevertheless, the inﬂuence even of adult women remains
circumscribed. As theorists like Collège de France Professor
Mireille Delmas-Marty have stressed, moreover, the process
of pluralistic dialogue must alter the structures of social and
economic inequality within which the seeds of armed violence
germinate.2
What did Grotius, our putative forefather of international
law, have to say about women and children? His historical
account afforded little relief for either. “[I]ncluded in the law of
war,” he stated, was a “right to inﬂict injury” that extended to
“the slaughter even of infants and of women ... with impunity.”
Yet his very mention of women and children hinted at
a preferred rule, one that he soon made explicit. “Children
should always be spared,” Grotius wrote, and so too most
women. Among his most plaintive examples in support of this
injunction is this quotation of another ancient Roman, Lucan:
“‘For what crime could little ones have deserved death?’”
Grotius typically portrayed women, no less than children,
as “innocents” who should be exempted from the ravages of
war. Notably, he included within this exemption a ban on
sexual assault. Grotius acknowledged that “many” writers
had maintained “that the raping of women in time of war is
permissible.” He disagreed:
A better conclusion has been reached by others,
who have taken into consideration not only the
injury but the unrestrained lust of the act; also,
the fact that such acts do not contribute to safety

or to punishment, and should consequently not go
unpunished in war any more than in peace.
That conclusion was “the law not of all nations, but of
the better ones,” Grotius wrote. He then insisted that among
“Christians” this view “shall be enforced, not only as a part
of military discipline, but also as a part of the law of nations;
that is, whoever forcibly violates chastity, even in war, should
everywhere be subject to punishment.”
The quoted passages depict women and children as
bystanders, beings not fully conscious of the world around them
– not actors, but rather objects, in the tableau of the battleﬁeld.
They are to be protected, rescued even, in service of the actors’
notions of honor. A social scientist would say they have no
agency. They are, ﬁrst and last, victims.
The depiction rings familiar almost four centuries later. Law
professors like Mark Drumbl of Washington and Lee University,
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin of the universities of Minnesota and of
Ulster, and Dianne Otto of the University of Melbourne are
just a few of the many scholars demonstrating that the discourse
of victimhood continues both to motivate and to justify global
action on behalf of persons perceived as victims.3
Here too, then, remnants of a colonialist power dynamic
persist in what is supposed to be a postcolonial era.
What is to be done? Makers of post-postcolonial international
law should aspire to deploy the tools of motivation and action in
a way that avoids reviving outdated notions of societal honor, and
instead honors the actual humans who endure violence amid war.
“Menwomenandchildren” is not a single word; discrete
attention must be paid to the many different hues of human
experience. Victimization may be an aspect of that experience,
but it is not the only one.
Consider this sentence from the story of someone
who survived World War II: “Children, even relatively
young children, learn to be cunning or street-smart when

2 Mireille Delmas-Marty, Global Law: A Triple Challenge (Naomi Norberg trans. 2003).
3 Mark Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (2012); Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Situating Women in Counterterrorism
Discourses: Undulating Masculinities and Luminal Femininities, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 1085 (2013); Dianne Otto, Power and Danger: Feminist Engagement
with International Law through the UN Security Council, Australian Feminist L.J. 97 (2010).
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So where does this leave us? If
not victim, who is our postpostcolonial child or woman,
and how should international law
both protect and empower her?

circumstances demand, and they are fast learners when they
have to be in order to live another day.” The author of this
passage, occurring in a 2009 book titled A Lucky Child: A
Memoir of Surviving Auschwitz as a Young Boy, is George
Washington University Law Professor Thomas Buergenthal,
whose career has included service as a judge on the
International Court of Justice.
Another backward glance reveals glimpses of Buergenthal’s
insight in Grotius’ time, and not only because Grotius himself
began the practice of law at the ripe old age of 17. Was there,
in that time, any foremother of international law?
In his introduction to a 1925 reissue of Grotius’ work, an
early president of the American Society of International Law,
James Brown Scott, praised “that noble woman who preserved
him” – that is, Grotius – “for us and for international law.”
That woman was Grotius’ wife, Maria de Groot.
When Dutch authorities detained the couple as political
dissidents, she and a maidservant stuffed Grotius in a trunk
and smuggled him to France. There he completed The Law of
War and Peace. As long ago as the 17th century, Maria and her
maid ﬂouted the stereotype of passive womanhood.
The same is surely true of two other women of that era.
One is the Spanish queen who commissioned the voyage of
Columbus; the other, the queen who waged war in England’s
ﬁrst colony and built a global navy whose power encroached
upon the Grotian tenet of mare liberum, freedom of the seas.
These two monarchs contributed mightily to colonialism, the
practice that Grotius and the Spanish priests theorized.
If Grotius is a forefather, therefore, Isabella and Elizabeth are
foremothers of international law. Perhaps it is in recognition of
their ruthless reigns that Grotius stopped short of advocating a
blanket exemption for women. To the contrary, he maintained
that wartime violence could be wreaked against women who
“have committed a crime which ought to be punished in a
special manner” – women who “take the place of men.”
This and other Grotian references to punishment direct me
to a ﬁnal consideration, accountability.
On this, Coomaraswamy’s talk was rather more sanguine than
am I. She cited with optimism developments aimed at improving
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the lot of women and of children – initiatives by nation-states and
by the United Nations, as well as Security Council resolutions and
International Criminal Court prosecutions.
A pessimist, however, would be pained to point out that the
Security Council’s Working Group on Children and Armed
Conﬂict seldom has acted on a years-old proposal to sanction
persistent perpetrators of grave violations like recruiting or using
child soldiers.
And although the ICC broke ground by convicting a militia
leader of those very war crimes, it also must be noted that two
subsequent verdicts acquitted other leaders of similar charges,
despite judges’ ﬁndings that child soldiers were everywhere
during the conﬂict under review. What is more, not one ICC
verdict yet has resulted in conviction on charges of sexual
violence.
Considered in light of developments at the Security Council,
legal technicalities that explain the ICC verdicts ought to be
put to one side in order to examine the possibility that the
international community may have entered a new era of soft
(some would say no) accountability.
So where does this leave us? If not victim, who is our postpostcolonial child or woman, and how should international law
both protect and empower her?
Initially, we must accept that she may not be a she. This is an
insight gaining currency in the last couple years, as global actors
start to address sexual violence and other wartime harms done to
boys and, yes, even to adult men.
Furthermore, there is much to be gleaned from the recent
scholarship of Emory Law Professor Martha Albertson
Fineman.4 That scholarship posits that what warrants protection
is not sex, not age, but vulnerability. It thus refocuses analysis
away from a singular identity as “man” or “woman” or “child”
and toward the varied ways that all persons, on account of
some traits but not others, at some periods in their lives but not
others, may be vulnerable.
It is to those moments of vulnerability that Fineman
would direct the making and implementation of law. Her
focus brings into view an image that transcends both colonial
and postcolonial assumptions of societal strata and personal
predilections. It thus bears promise for the envisaging of a postpostcolonial future.
Who knows? Maybe a global culture cognizant that everyone
at times is weak will prove less eager to initiate armed violence,
less apt to tolerate the violence done by structural inequalities
and more willing to construct a just and enduring peace.
4 E.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive
State, 60 Emory L.J. 251 (2010–2011).
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